Last ned (Gratis)

Abstrakt

Exploitation of microprocessor side channels can be improved if one has
access to details regarding the physical layout of the microprocessor. It
has been shown that the capacitance between bus wires influence the
signals at the electromagnetic side channel. This paper provides a noninvasive
technique for establishing the relative position of microprocessor
bus wires. Thus, used in combination with signal analysis techniques,
our results may improve side channel exploitation capabilities.

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